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NOTES
A CHANGE EFFECTED IN THE SALES LAW OF KEN-
TUCKY BY THE RECENT ADOPTION OF THE
UNIFORM SALES ACT*
The recent adoption by the Legislature of Kentucky of the
Uniform Sales Act has brought about some interesting changes
in the law of sales in Kentucky. One change which will doubt-
less be very noticeable in the future has to do with the doctrine
of potential existence. This doctrine has long been recognized
in England and consequently America, but at the present day
has been modified in. many respects by reason of the Sales Acts.
To get an idea of the subject matter as a whole, it is neces-
sary to have first an understanding of this doctrine of potential
existence, and then it will be easy to note the change that has
been effected by the Sales Act.
Things have a p6tential existence which are the natural
product or the expected increase of something already belongitig
to the seller. There is a conflict of authority on the question
as to what constitutes a potential existence of a chattel so as to
render it the subject matter of sale. It has been recognized
from an early date that the future wool grown on sheep owned
by the seller at the time of the sale may be the subject of a valid
sale, vesting such wool and the -title thereto in the purchaser as
soon as it comes into existence.' The same was true in regard
to a crop of hay to be grown on a certain field, or again the
milk that a certain number of cows would yield in a month.
Explaining further, it is well settled that a transmutation
of title to. the property sold is an essential element of a sale, as
distinguished from an executory contract of sale, and therefore
in order to make a complete sale of property whereby the title
would pass from the seller to the buyer, it is necessary that the
thing which is the subject of the sale should have an actual or
*This is the second of a series of articles concerning the changes
effected In the law of Kentucky by virtue of the Uniform Sales Act
passed at the last session of the Kentucky Legislature. The first article,
appearing in the November, 1928 issue written by George Ragland and
entitled "The Uniform Sales Act in Kentucky" dealt with the important
change in the theory of documents of title.
IMayer v. Taylor, 69 Ala. 403; Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250.
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potential existence at the date of the sale. 2 For example, in the
case of Hutohinson, McChesney and Co. v. Ford it was held that
a mortgage of a crop to be raised on a farm during a certain
term passes no title if the crop was not sown when the mortgage
was executed, and a mortgagee has no claim against a purchaser
of the crop for it or for its value.
On the other hand property may be the subject of a sale if
it has a potential or possible existence, as the product or in-
crease of that which is in existence and the right to it when it
shall come into existence is a present vested right. In all such
cases the thing sold has a potential existence, and the hopes or
expectations of means founded on a right in esse is the object of
sale. 8
In the United States the doctrine of potential possession has
-received frequent recognition from the courts, especially in
transfer of crops to be thereafter grown. Nearly all the cases
relate to mortgages, but so far as concerns the legal title, there
seems no difference unless created by statute between the power
of the owner of land to mortgage and to sell the crops growing
thereon.4
It is held in most states that the owner of land may mort-
gage a future crop. 5 In a few states, in'cluding Kentucky, the
brop must be actually planted in order that the mortgage shall
be valid.6 The courts follow the same rule in the young of
animals. It is assumed that the same doctrine that is here ap-
plied in illustration of mortgages is applicable in sales.
In all the cases the thing sold must be established or based
on a thing in esse. A mere possibility in or growing out of the
property cannot be made the subject of a valid sale or transfer.
In Wheeler v. Wheeler,7 a son contracted to sell his interest in
his father's estate to his brother. The court said: "The thing
sold must have an actual or potential existence. A hope or ex-
pectation of means founded on a right in being may be the sub-
2Hutchnson v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.) 318; Low v. Pew, 108 Mass.
347; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 2 Met. (Ky.) 474.
S 23 R. C. L. 1244.
"Williston on Sales, Sec. 135.
5 Briggs v. United States, 143 U. S. 346; Wilkinson v. Kitler, 69 Ala.
485; Arques v. Warson, 61 Calif. 620; Close v. Hodges, 44 Minn. 204.
6 Redd v. Burrus, 58 Ga. 574; Stowell v. Blair, 5 Ill. Appeal 104;
Hutchinson v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.) 318; Cole v. Kerr, 19 Neb. 553.
v Supra, note 2.
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ject of a sale because in such case there is a potential existence.
But a mere possibility or contingency not founded upon the
right coupled with'an interest, cannot be."
But a person can make only an executory agreement to sell
and not an actual sale where the subject of the contract is some-
thing to be acquired in the future, such as wool from sheep or
the milk of any cows, which he may buy within a specified time. 8
In Low v. Pew9 for instance, one has no potential property
in a catch of fish he expects to make even though he has a ship
and nets and other appliances necessary for catching fish. He
has no property actual or potential until they are caught, and
cannot pass any property right in them until that time.
It seems that the Sales Act has a tendency to abolish poten-
tial possession from the law of sales. Professor Williston says:
"The conclusion of the draughtsman of the English Sale of
Goods Act seems sound, 'That there is no natibnal distinction
between one 'class of future goods and another.' "10 Conse-
quently the American Sales Act makes no exception to the
general rule as to future goods in favor of goods of which the
seller has potential possession. The buyer of such goods cannot
acquire under provision of this act more than an equitable prop-
erty right. He will not acquirb even this, moreover, except
in jurisdictions which give such a right in regard to future goods
of other kinds. As .ortgages, however, are not covered by the
Sales Act except in a few instances where it is so specially stated,
the power to make an effective mortgage of crops or other future
goods is not affected by the Act.
In the Uniform Sales Act as passed by the Kentucky Legis-
lature under "Subject Matter of Contract," see. 5, "Existing
and Future Goods," sub-see. 3, the language is as follows:
"Where parties purport to effect a present sale of future goods,
the agreement operates as a contract to sell the goods." It
appears that under the Uniform Sales Act the potential existence
doctrine of sales in Kentucky is apparently abolished. This
seems to accord with the view of a writer in the California Law
Review who says, "The doctrine of potential existence is a com-
SLow v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347; Aygues v. Warson, 51 Calif. 620; Moody
V. Wright, 13 Met. (Mass.) 17.
' Supra, note 8.
"Williston on Sales, Sec. 135.
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mon law fiction. There is no doubt of the possibility both at
common law and under our law today of contracting to sell
goods which the seller does not own at the time."' 11 But it is
obvious in the nature of the ease that it is impossible for the
seller to transfer presently title to goods to which he has no
ownership at the time of sale. As he has no title he can give
none.
12
The common law made no exception to this rule in the case
of crops and the young of animals, which the seller as the owner
of root and stem was afterward to acquire, and gave it a wider
effect thah a contract to sell. The doctrine was laid down in the
leading case of Graham v. Hawley,'$ that the crops of specified
land, the future young of specific animals, or the wool to be
clipped in the future from specified sheep, can be bargained and
sold at law because the seller has potential possession.
In England in 1846 it was applied against an attaching
creditor of crops who was deprived of the property attached be-
cause it had been mortgaged by the occupant of the land before
it came into existence.
1 4
The effect of this doctrine, obviously based on fiction, is not
only that the legal title to the future property passes to the
buyer as soon as the property comes into existence, but that
this title is regarded as relating back to the tinie of the agree-
ment. The American Sales Act makes no exception to the
general rule as to future goods in favor of goods to which the
seller has potential possession. The Sales Act therefore appar-
ently abolishes the doctrine of potential possession from the law
of sales, which however has no application to mortgages.
So far as sales are concerned the adoption of the Uniform
Sales Act in Kentucky makes the sale of future goods, whether
they have potential existence or not, nothing more than an
agreement to sell. The abolition of the doctrine may be wise.
If the ordinary doctrines applicable to real and personal prop-
erty do not afford as much protection as is desirable to trans-
actions relating to crops or animals the extent of the right of the
7 Calif. L. Rev. 140.
12 Emerson v. European R. R. Co., 67 Mo. 357.
1161 Hab. 132.
" Pitch v. Tutin, 15 M. & W. 110.
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seller should be exactly defined and more closely limited than
is done under the doctrine of potential possession.
Kentucky in adopting the Uniform Sales Act has'fallen in
line with the majority of the states in adopting uniform laws.
By virtue of this particular act it may be said in conclusion that
the recognition given by Kentucky courts heretofore to the sale
of goods only in potential existence is abolished and that such
agreementA will hereafter be treated not as sales, but only as
contracts to sell.
CH z LJ. DA m.
